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     Classified as an “American Tragedy” and “an immeasurable” mistake by the 
United States, the Vietnam War lives on in history existing as a labyrinth of 
political decisions and a set of enigmatic motivations. Spanning six 
presidencies, involvement with Vietnam began during President Truman’s years 
in office and continued through to the Nixon years; but it is most heavily 
associated with John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidencies. The 
damage created by the war is indefinite and may never be fully estimated. 
With reexamination it is becoming clearer that Vietnam may have been a war 
the United States did not need to fight. The late 60’s and early 70’s is a 
decade marked by revolution, protests, and chaos. It was the decade of civil 
rights, the emergence of New Left approaches, feminist movements, and anti-
war protests. Associated with leading the anti-wear movement were university 
students; the University of Oregon in Eugene, Oregon in particular, has been 
marked by its anti-war activity and student protests during that time. Though 
students are most heavily linked to the protests, there was a strong anti-war 
sentiment shared by soldiers in Vietnam as well. The stories of veteran 
protests is often overshadowed by campus activity during the turbulent time; 
however, there are many parallels between student protests and soldier 
protests.  
Directly following the war and existing still today, is a feeling of 
betrayal. Veterans feel betrayed by the anti-war sentiment, and many American 
citizens who were opposed to the war still harbor those furious emotions. 
During the war there was often a separation between the United States 
citizens and the soldiers. Many saw the soldiers as supporters of the war, 
when in reality, a majority were opposed to U.S. involvement in Vietnam.  By 
examining U of O protests and the experiences of one veteran, a commonality 
is revealed. The historical context of the Vietnam War and the entanglement 
of President Johnson with Vietnam provided motivation for the anti-war 
sentiment. It becomes evident that the foundation of the protests was the 
disparity of the protesters and the helplessness of the situation. 
Specifically, U of O student protests and the stories of Vietnam veteran 
Frank Flowers, illuminate the similarities between student and soldier 
protests.  
 On the relatively small campus of U of O, the messages of student 
leaders and protestors could not be ignored. One of the most important 
resources for examining student protests were the articles featured in The 
Oregon Daily Emerald. The paper was one of the most widely distributed and 
influential news sources on campus because it covered campus issues, and was 
written and researched by students. With regards to the Vietnam War, the two 
main issues covered in The Emerald were events involving the ROTC and the 
radical aspects of the anti-war protests.  
Until 1971 The Emerald was not an independent paper from the University. 
Thus, there were restrictions on printable material for the reporters. The 
goal of the paper was to publish factual articles with limited biases; the 
paper would not be used as a tool to further personal interests. Throughout 
the years of 1968-1970, saturating a majority of the paper were Vietnam 
related articles. Several articles discussed demands made by the student body 
with regards to the anti-war protests. Students felt that the administration 
and faculty should take a stance on the war and voice their opinions in 
support of the protestors. Robert D. Clark presented several speeches to the 
student body addressing the necessity of civil obedience and cooperation 
between the student body and the administration. Approaching the fall term 
of 1968, U of O was undergoing a drastic transformation in both its campus 
life, and the individuals who occupied it. 
 During that same time period, Frank Flowers was residing in his birth 
town of Boston, Massachusetts. Having grown up in a big city, Frank felt 
exposed to the national news, but uninterested. He concludes that “I 
preferred not pay attention to the war, I had friends that were enlisting and 
people would talk about it on occasion. However, in the beginning no one 
really discussed it in that great of detail, not like the Iraq War today.” 
Frank’s naivety to America’s involvement in Vietnam could be expected. The 
nation was blind-sighted by the war; efforts by the administration and lack 
of media coverage kept military action hidden until the late 60’s. The 
intervention in Vietnam was a rapid and unforeseen event that caught the 
United States off guard. Many people still today, are unaware of disregarded 
lessons the U.S. should have learned from, in order to prevent such a 
horrific war.  
As far back as 1765, Vietnam was an interest to France for various reasons, 
one being the expansion of Christianity.  Catholicism left permanent 
imprints in Vietnam, decades later a majority of the communist groups that 
ruled Vietnam were led by devout, radical Catholics. And although the 
Vietnamese embraced the new religion, by the end of the seventeenth century 
the French saw no hope in remaining involved in Vietnam economic or political 
affairs…not until a few decades later. In 1787 “France was tottering on the 
brink of bankruptcy, and Louis XVI, an indecisive man, initially rejected the 
idea of a costly expedition to Asia…but finally outlined a precise military 
plan for conquest of Vietnam.”  France failed to conquer Vietnam despite 
several decades of fighting, and as a result, the “acts of incredible 
brutality, opened Vietnam to Western ideas that, along with the violence and 
repression and humiliation, rekindled Vietnamese nationalism.”  This 
newfound nationalism ultimately created the greatest obstacle between 
American and Vietnamese correspondence. Americans greatly underestimated the 
determination the Vietnamese had towards defending their nation and 
protecting itself from intruders. Commenting on France’s failures with 
Vietnam, Frank reiterates, “that we should have learned from France’s 
mistakes. If they couldn’t do it, we shouldn’t have thought we could dominate 
over there. If we had paid attention and learned vicariously, we would not 
have followed in their footsteps.” America attempted to be a police force 
mediating all of the world’s problems, and the struggle with Vietnam proved 
to be too great of a challenge. 
With the turmoil existing between France and Vietnam, President Roosevelt 
attempted to ease some of the conflict. But becoming involved in such an 
ancient battle simply led to deeper American involvement. By 1950 an 
announcement was given that if Indochina fell to Communism, then almost all 
other Asian nations would as well. The Truman administration was apprehensive 
about the threat, but became interested in the French, North and South Korea, 
and other Asian countries' conflicts. The United States had become infamous 
for underestimating the threat of other nations, and Vietnam proved to be 
another example of the overconfidence of America. The removed involvement 
with overseas turmoil continued through Eisenhower’s presidency, and through 
Kennedy’s. Eisenhower warned Kennedy to be aggressive and adamant about 
involvement with Vietnam. Instead Kennedy floundered between other 
international conflicts and was apprehensive about intervening in Vietnam, 
despite strong encouragement from advisors. During the early sixties, Kennedy 
continued drafting American soldiers, preparing for an unforeseen decade of 
war.  
In the year 1962, Vietnam Veteran, Francis Flowers was just nineteen years of 
age and had become eligible for draft. By 1962 the draft was heavily underway 
and Frank was adamant about avoiding war. The Vietnam War was one of the 
first times in American history that such a devastatingly large mass of young 
males were called upon to defend their nation. At first only 19-25 year old 
males were eligible for draft, and as Frank remembers, it was typically only 
his lower class friends that were drafted first. While the draft began, 
Frank knew he was opposed to the war and did not want to go overseas to risk 
his life for a nation’s cause that he did not support. He was able to receive 
work deferment, permitted by the United States, which excused males from 
having to participate in the draft.  
Typically only upper class men were able to receive this deferment because 
they were stereotypically the ones that were attending college, had 
respectable jobs, or had the financial power to avoid the draft. (For 
example, one friend of Frank’s came from an extremely wealthy family. In 
order to avoid the draft his family sent him to live in Canada and avoid the 
war altogether. Those without such financial assistance were forced into the 
draft lottery). Though not from an extremely wealthy family, Frank was able 
to receive work deferment because he had found a job in Boston with 
Baird/Atomic, a company that built plane parts for the Spy U2 airplanes used 
in the Vietnam War. He felt very fortunate that he was able to avoid the 
draft, but because he easily received the deferment, the possibility of going 
to war did not seem overwhelming. The irony is that although Frank had not 
yet been drafted, he was still actively involved in the war by working for a 
company that directly supported the war.  
As the war was underway, all turmoil of Vietnam was halted momentarily when 
Kennedy was assassinated.  The horrific circumstances, in which the president 
was taken from his nation, made it hard for Americans to further criticize 
the work of one man who had just been murdered. And so the heat of the 
nation’s problems was reassigned to Lyndon B. Johnson who inherited not only 
the presidency but also the negative portion of the Kennedy legacy. Johnson 
was in sole possession of the burden to please both the shaken nation and an 
administration that was by now, overly eager to intervene in a war beyond 
American comprehension. Thus, America had already become nonchalantly 
involved in Vietnam so withdrawal was no longer realistic; Johnson’s only 
solution was to take some form of action.  Yet the irony involved in the 
situation was that after Kennedy failed to take action, and in fact defied 
his administrative suggestions, Johnson continued in his footsteps and 
avoided taking immediate presidential action.  
Johnson was desperate to win over the nation and fulfill his presidential 
duties; therefore, he feared entering a war that might contradict his social 
legislation and efforts to assuage the country’s turmoil and chaos that 
directly followed the assassination of Kennedy. Johnson “worried that the 
country as a whole would not rally behind the war and he feared that the 
support was wide but not deep, that if American people were asked to 
sacrifice their lives and money to any greater extent, they would turn on 
him.” Johnson’s fears were legitimate but he made the costly decision of 
ignoring his instincts, and instead of refusing to enter the United States in 
a war he believed would backfire, he concealed preliminary military action in 
Vietnam and the consensus to go to war.  
 Though it was not entirely Johnson’s war, it was his direct presidency that 
launched and re-launched the United States into an international war. Frank 
comments on his observations of the war prior to being drafted: “I had 
several friends that had been drafted and had died within months of being 
overseas. I saw the nation slowly begin to realize that Vietnam was an 
inevitable loss and yet more and more young men were being sent over. How 
could the government not see that no matter how many men were fighting, we 
still would not ‘win’?” Johnson recognized the inner conflict between 
northern and southern Vietnam and the necessity for South Vietnam to be 
supported by the United States in order to prevent communism and guerrilla 
tactics to be enforced by North Vietnam. The inner national conflict was 
simmering in 1941 as the French attempted to lend aid and support, only 
thickening the tension. Despite warning by the French, the United States 
entered the Vietnamese conflict and by 1965 the turmoil was approaching 
boiling point as American troops began bombing North Vietnam in retaliation 
of their attacks on South Vietnam. The confusion within Vietnam only spread 
to the United States, with the continuation of student protests.  
Analyzing the conflict between North and South Vietnam, the American 
administration relied heavily on the scheme to send aid to South Vietnam and 
build up retaliation against the Viet Cong in northern Vietnam. The 
administration relied heavily on the power of rhetoric, emphasizing the 
“domino-theory” and threat of communism to fuel the fear of the nation. They 
hoped a fearful nation would then support the administration’s decisions to 
act. Troops entered Vietnam and with advice from Defense Secretary, Robert 
McNamara, ground and air forces were intensified. As a result on August 2, of 
1964, Northern Vietnam torpedoes attacked the American military ship the 
Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. This attack shocked the United States who had 
not anticipated the preparedness of the North Vietnamese; two days after the 
incident, Johnson demanded bombing attacks on North Vietnam and requested 
authorization from Congress for complete power over the United States 
military in order to prevent future attacks.  
This was a groundbreaking request from Johnson; no president had previously 
been granted power over the United States military for whatever means 
necessary to stop the spread or intensification of a current war effort. 
“What the hell were they thinking?” was Frank’s response to the news. He 
continued: “I immediately knew that the Tonkin Resolution would not result in 
anything but more losses of American lives and an even greater disappointment 
in the war effort with Vietnam. The only thing that scares me is if future 
presidents make the same request and it is granted again. This failure should 
be remembered so it can’t occur again.” Johnson was granted his request and 
the power to have complete access and control over American military forces 
was labeled the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. But “the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
and accompanying air strikes against the North had clearly not produced the 
anticipated effect in South Vietnam…these measures failed to induce greater 
political cohesion in the faltering Saigon regime.”   Although Johnson had 
been granted his request of military power, the gift had not been as powerful 
as anticipated and so just “three weeks after Tonkin, the Joint Chiefs pushed 
for ‘an accelerated program of actions’ against the north”. Tonkin only 
increased the confusion and outrage that surrounded Johnson. 
Immediately after the Tonkin Resolution, which was designed for intense and 
immediate action, Johnson claimed that “the proper answer to those advocating 
immediate and extensive action against the North was that we should not do 
this until our side could defend itself in the streets of Saigon…with a weak 
and wobbly situation it would be unwise to attack until we could stabilize 
our base.”  Once again Johnson’s caution and insecurities as President made 
people question his ulterior motives, interpreting Vietnam action as 
“prerequisite of strengthening a political base…a calculation for advantage 
in his campaign for re-election.”  
After the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution the Viet Cong united and intensified 
their desire for victory more than ever. By 1966 Johnson had sent over three 
hundred thousand troops in Vietnam where the war seemed hopeless and never 
ending. As more information filtered through the United States about Kennedy 
fallacies, mainly his inability to commit to a war effort in Vietnam, and 
undesirable decisions being activated by Johnson’s administration, the war 
effort turned negative. As Frank recalls, “the extreme anti-war sentiment and 
student protests began after the Gulf of Tonkin, it was the even that caught 
the attention of the nation”. The end of 1966 tragically divided the United 
States over the issue of supporting the war. Violent riots began to surface 
throughout the nation, and an anti-war sentiment was embraced. The 
administration was devastated by the new anti-war stand that many Americans 
enveloped, which drastically contradicted the pro-war majority that existed 
just months prior. Despite LBJ’s efforts to minimize his recent decisions to 
intensify and widen the U.S. effort in Vietnam, public and congressional 
opposition to his policy had increased, along with the fevered pitch of 
student protests. 
Prior to American entry into Vietnam, the Viet Cong was under the Ngo Dinh 
Diem regime. Diem along with Ngo Dinh Nhu led the communist nation. The 
initial motivation for United States intervention in Vietnam was to overthrow 
the Diem regime. In 1960 the two Vietnamese leaders were captured by American 
military personnel and brutally murdered. As a result Ho Chi Minh rose to 
power to lead the Viet Cong. (International relations were so unsuccessful at 
this time that Johnson announced he was not entering in another election. The 
nation was shocked that he would not run for another presidency; however, his 
successor would prove to be equally unprepared. It was nearing the end of 
1969 when President Richard Nixon had taken office, that the United States 
government received an ultimatum from Minh demanding an end to American 
intervention and overriding Nixon’s previous ultimatum. “Nixon’s diplomatic 
attacks had no effect…having relied on military pressure to bring a quick and 
decisive end to the war, he suddenly found himself without a policy.”) With 
a unified Viet Cong, America’s ability to dominate Vietnam was becoming less 
and less realistic.  
Historian George C. Herring summarized Johnson’s mistakes as: “he had 
disregarded the advice he did not want to hear in favor of a policy based on 
the pursuit of his own political fortunes and his beloved domestic 
programs.”  It was not a war that America wanted to be held responsible for. 
As the war continued it became more evident that it was a hopeless military 
effort and a feat that the nation could not overcome. Rather than a victory, 
which the United States had anticipated, the Vietnam War would loom overhead 
for decades to follow as a guilty conscious of failed administrative actions 
and the inescapable insecurities of one man. 
When Johnson was inaugurated he inherited decades worth of American problems 
preceding his presidency. He was determined to maintain national support for 
his actions above all other concerns. “In this period, (he) show (ed) a 
preference for steps that would remain non-committing to combat,” which 
coincided with the national sentiment. Johnson was the exemplary example of 
the power of rhetoric. Johnson relied on his rhetoric to either assuage the 
criticism of the nation, or to unite the nation behind the necessity of the 
war. But Johnson could not continue to please his public forever; in his last 
desperate attempts to regain power, he “ordered that contingency planning for 
pressures against North Vietnam should be speeded up. The impelling force 
behind the Administration’s desire to step up the action during this period 
was its recognition of the steady deterioration in the positions of the pro-
American governments in Laos and South Vietnam, and the corresponding 
weakening of the United States hold on both these countries.” The reality 
finally hit Johnson by the beginning of 1968 that the war was not going to be 
won.  
Rather than surrendering to America’s weakness, Johnson “quietly and without 
fanfare, re-launched the United States its longest, most frustrating, and 
most divisive war. Johnson thus took the nation into war in Vietnam by 
indirection and dissimulation.” The Vietnam War was approaching a decade 
worth of fighting and yet Johnson remained adamant with his desperate 
attempts to conceal military action from the citizens of the United States, 
as well as his refusal to cooperate with his advisors. The American public 
was awakening to the absurdities of continuing the war but “by this time 
Johnson recognized that achievement of U.S. objectives in Vietnam would 
require a sustained and costly commitment, he refused to submit his policies 
to public or congressional debate.” The president was desperate to prove to 
himself and to the nation that he was capable of leading the country and 
winning an international war by himself. Already battling massive 
insecurities and self-doubt, having to confide in advisors and accept other 
administrators’ advice and opinions, would only weaken Johnson’s confidence. 
And so allowing others to help him with his diplomatic decisions was seen as 
a weakness and an unthinkable measure to be taken.  
Johnson continued to “mislead the nation as to the significance of the steps 
he was taking. To avoid ‘undue excitement’ and to make his decisions more 
palatable to potential waverers, he and his aides issued dire warnings that 
failure to act decisively would result in playing into the hands of those who 
wanted to take drastic measures.” Johnson wanted to fear those in opposition 
into supporting his decisions. If Americans did not want involvement in 
Vietnam than Johnson propagandized that if Americans did not support 
intervening now, then it would be too late and more horrific and devastating 
events would take place.  
Americans were not falling for Johnson’s tactics however, and in hindsight of 
the war, American intervention with Vietnam has been criticized with the 
charge that “America was disinterested in the threat of Communism and that 
internationally the United States approached the danger of Vietnam 
surrendering to Communist upheaval nonchalantly”. In other words, the claims 
that America was fighting an international war to prevent the spread of 
communism were falsified with the allegations that more scandalous motives 
were the true catalysts of U.S. intervention.  
The United States only “created an artificial, externally sustained states 
that lacked any substantial indigenous foundation.”  It was the result of 
troop intervention failing, that Johnson enlisted more help of American 
troops as well as Allied forces. From an increased seventy-five thousand 
troops to an estimated one hundred and thirty-five thousand troops, power 
over the Vietnamese was only projected to last a year until the end of 1965, 
by which more aide would be required. This pitiful realization summarized the 
hopelessness of Johnson’s situation and the circumstances that the United 
States had been led into. Having immersed American troops into Vietnam, as 
the years progressed and war defeats did not proclaim a “winner”, Johnson 
reacted to the problem by simply sending more help into the situation and 
prolonging the embarrassing conclusion that this was a battle of victims and 
no successes.  
Johnson’s involvement with the war epitomized the guilt and troubling 
conscious that Vietnam was an American mistake. As it had been pointed out, 
“the President’s resounding triumph in the Tonkin Gulf affair brought 
enormous, if still hidden, costs…Johnson’s victory in Congress may have 
encouraged him to take the legislators lightly in making future policy 
decisions on Vietnam.” “While drastically expanding its military operation 
in Vietnam, the United States also grappled with what many had always 
regarded as the central problem-construction of a viable South Vietnamese 
nation.”  As the close of 1968 demonstrated, the year of battle ended “with 
deadlock on the battlefield and in diplomatic councils.” Johnson’s attempts 
at conquering Vietnam proved ineffective and the only immediate outcome of 
American intervention in Vietnam was drastic loss of lives, and the 
completion of the nation’s longest war. 
Johnson’s desperate need to find acceptance in the White House, penetrated 
into all of his presidential actions, which is demonstrated yet again in the 
release of “The Consensus to Bomb North Vietnam” in the end of 1964. “The 
administration consensus on bombing came at the height of the Presidential 
election contest between President Johnson and Senator Barry Goldwater, whose 
advocacy of full-scale air attacks on North Vietnam had become a major 
issue.” It was a known fact that Johnson was apprehensive towards entering a 
full-scale war.  
As the war continued Frank worked for Baird/Atomic and attended college. 
In1967, the United States attempted to draft him once again. This time he was 
able to receive a temporary college deferment. Ordinarily only wealthier 
white, Anglo-Saxon males were able to receive the college deferment as Frank 
remembers. But because he was already twenty-four and had a few connections 
in Boston, he was able to dodge the draft. The unusual thing about the 
Vietnam War was that the United States fought for so many years, that there 
was such an unreal amount of troops that were called upon. Frank was of 
course afraid of the possibility of having to enter the war; however, he had 
avoided the draft for so long that he was confident that his luck would 
continue to protect him. 
 American involvement in an international war was a threatening thought for 
the President Johnson, but the more lucid reality was that Johnson was 
willing to come dangerously close to committing to a war if it resulted in 
presidential guarantees. The Gulf of Tonkin Affair depicted Johnson’s 
disparity in maintaining power and pleasing both the public and the 
government. Many of the previous military tactics were concealed from the 
Senate and Congress leaving them “completely unaware of what was contemplated 
as President Johnson went on to win a landslide election against his 
component that he portrayed as a reckless war adventurer.” This was a cheap 
attack considering the absent-minded approach that Johnson embodied when 
analyzing the threat of Vietnam. Johnson was walking the fine line between 
making promises to the government and to the public. It was when the two 
collided that America floundered in an unprecedented war that would shake the 
nation’s security for decades to follow.  
By the end of 1967 it had become impossible for Johnson to avoid commitment 
to Vietnam. All deferment plans were withdrawn, and all American males 
between 19-25 were heavily drafted. The United States government attempted to 
draft Frank yet again. In order to be drafted all soldiers needed to receive 
a physical from their local induction center. Frank knew that if he did not 
receive his physical then he could not be drafted. Therefore, exhibiting his 
strong anti-war stance, he moved from Boston to California. He devised a 
strategy where he successfully “hid” from the draft for the better portion of 
two additional years. 
His scheme involved his two of his best friends who lived in Boston and in 
Florida while Frank was in California. The government would send Frank a 
letter requesting him to report to his local induction center to receive his 
physical. But he could not be cleared until his medical records were sent to 
the induction center where he was being inspected. And so, the government 
would send him a letter to California requesting he get his physical and he 
would return their letter stating he needed his medical records from Boston. 
Once the records arrived in California he would then send the letter to his 
friend in Florida who would pretend to be Frank and send a request to Boston 
asking for Frank’s medical records to be sent to Florida. After the records 
were sent to Florida the same steps were taken only this time Frank’s friend 
claimed to be him in Boston. It took anywhere from a several weeks up to a 
few months for all the official letters and records to be sent to the three 
locations; thus, Frank was able to live in California and remain out of the 
draft for two years.  
But after two years Frank’s good luck caught up with him and one final letter 
was sent to him classifying him as an “evasive individual”. Therefore, though 
Frank was twenty-six years of age and technically unqualified to be drafted, 
the United States vetoed the age cutoff. Frank’s whole plan was to dodge the 
draft until he was twenty-six and then he could no longer be drafted because 
of age requirements. The government acknowledged his plan and made an 
exception due to the circumstances. 
Finally, when it seemed the war could not become any more hopeless, the Viet 
Cong attacked South Vietnam on January 30, 1968: Tet, the official new year 
of the Vietnamese. The Tet Offensive was a psychological victory for the Viet 
Cong and it “marked the watershed of the American effort. Henceforth, no 
matter how effective our actions, the prevalent strategy could no longer 
achieve its objectives within a period or with force levels politically 
acceptable to the American people…this made inevitable an eventual commitment 
to a political solution and marked the beginning of the quest for a 
negotiated settlement.”  But a settlement was never reached, instead some 
argue it was the final blow marked by the Tet offensive, that forced 
withdrawal of American troops and the surrendering of America’s involvement 
in the pitiful war effort.  
Perhaps the most frustrating part of Frank Flowers’ experience in the Vietnam 
War, was that it had become a hopeless and openly failed war effort. The 
public had become more informed of the overseas war effort and the losses of 
American lives. America’s administration had expressed first over confidence, 
then somewhat embarrassed realizations that Vietnam was not a war that 
America would win. Yet even after Johnson resigned and admitted his failures, 
Frank was still sent into the war. In 1969 Frank reported to the Boston 
induction center where he received his physical at 9am and was held under 
federal arrest on the base, due to fear of flight. Then he was boarded onto a 
bus and driven to Georgia for a four-week boot camp. At five o’clock that 
same night he was allowed one phone call home where he told his mother he 
would not be home for dinner because he had been drafted into the Vietnam War 
and was in Georgia. Frank remembers that as soon as he mentioned Vietnam, his 
mother immediately became hysterical. Family friends of theirs had lost 
several young men in the war effort, and she knew that losing her son was a 
frightening option. The phone call would be the last conversation they would 
have for several years. Frank explained that once he was in the Vietnam 
jungle there was a strict radio silence that was enforced. This was because 
non-Viet Cong soldiers did not want their tank communication to be heard by 
Viet Cong soldiers, especially in ambush situations. Mail was also a rare 
occurrence because helicopters would transport mail into the jungle and 
simply drop packages of letters but it took up to several weeks to send or 
receive any form of communication from back home. For Frank, he would receive 
newspaper clippings from his best friend of the anti-war movements that were 
occurring. Frank and his troop members chose to throw away the newspaper 
clippings and remain focused on surviving.  
Once in Georgia, Frank attended the stereotypical boot camp of 4am wake up 
calls, five-mile morning runs, and intense military training for four weeks. 
Near the end of the four weeks he developed a sharp pain in his side where he 
could no longer stand in his squads. Frank had no respect for authority, he 
thus saw his refusal to abide my military law as an expression of his anti-
war sentiment. For example, as he experience the pain in his side and stepped 
out of line, the head drill instructor asked if he had a profile, (a record 
of the physical each soldier received that would mention any medical 
problems), Frank said yes he had one, and turned sideways to show his 
physical profile. The drill instructor “went ballistic”, and Frank’s attitude 
problems were recorded in his war portfolio as he was shipped off to San 
Antonio Texas: Fort Sam Houston. A means for survival as well as a right he 
felt he had to express his opposition, Frank was punished several times for 
his lack of respect for the authorities. As Frank was receiving war training, 
President Johnson finally surrendered to his failures. 
 In the end of 1969, Johnson had officially resigned his power as President, 
and as lead dictator of the Vietnam involvement. The legacy was then passed 
on to Richard Nixon who continued American involvement in Vietnam into the 
early part of the 1970’s when finally the United States was prepared, or 
rather embarrassingly forced, into surrendering and removing all troops. But 
it is within the juxtaposed years of 1968-1970 when the United States could 
not agree upon continuing the war effort in Vietnam or completely withdrawing 
troops, a majority of Frank Flowers’ story and U of O student protests 
exists.  
By the end of 1969, Frank was assigned to a training base in Texas. Texas was 
a much different environment; for two weeks the soldiers learned how to make 
a bed and took truck-driving lessons. In hindsight Frank cannot believe that, 
“the only training we had was how to make a bed. We’d spend up to several 
hours a day either running, or folding in bed sheets. I knew this was not 
going to help me Vietnam; they wanted to create a low-key atmosphere”. Then 
the last two weeks was medic training where Frank learned how to assess a 
wound and bandage a bleeding victim as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
(Eventually while in Vietnam, after being injured in the line of duty Frank 
became a medic. Frank witnessed one of his friends who was also medic, be 
attacked and killed by his own troop members because they wanted morphine so 
badly they had lost all sanity). “The first thing I did when I landed in 
Vietnam, was laid out all my morphine and pain killers and had my troops tank 
drive over them”, recalls Frank.  
After the eight weeks of various boot camps, the soldiers were given a quick 
vacation to return home and say goodbye to their families before they were to 
be sent to Vietnam. At this time Frank returned to Boston for a few days but 
was under such strict surveillance that he knew his reporting officer would 
find him too easily if he went home to South Boston. Frank was determined to 
avoid being sent to Vietnam, so instead of reaming in “Southie”, he fled to 
New York where he stayed with his girlfriend and her family in Long Island. 
He failed to keep in contact with his managing officer, and thus Frank was 
labeled AWOL: absent without leave. Succumbing to the guilt that others were 
dying in Vietnam, and he was hiding only for the sake of himself, Frank 
reported to the Boston headquarters months after his required date. By winter 
of ’69 Frank finally arrived in Vietnam where he suffered a gunshot wound in 
the line of duty and exposure to Agent Orange and malaria. After a few 
months in the troop hospital, he was transported to a new location further 
into the Vietnamese jungle where he became an official medic. When asked 
about back home, “I tried not to think about the anti-war protests happening, 
nor the separation many soldiers felt from their home. I wanted to only focus 
on surviving, and though I did protest as much as I could, some protests were 
merely a strategy for survival. I was just lucky that they coincided.” Frank 
did however realize, the irony in his anti-war protests being avoidance of 
violence, while many anti-war protests in the states involved excessive force 
and use of violence. 
The generalization that student protests were violent on the U of O campus 
was the direct result of the protest coverage by the local newspaper. A 
majority of The Emerald’s articles during 68-70 were devoted to campus 
protest activities that required administrative and/or police intervention.  
The two main events publicized were a sit-in at Johnson Hall and vandalism to 
the ROTC building. In reality it was not that all student protests were 
violent, but the ones that were arguably the most successful at receiving 
attention were ones that were disobedient. For example on April 22, 1970 
vandalism and attacks were made on the ROTC building on campus. Police were 
requested and several students were arrested and obtained. Outraged that the 
administration did not support the causes of the student protests students 
felt inclined to reiterate their beliefs. Similarly, in an article entitled 
“Students take Johnson Hall”, over three hundred students formed a sit-in at 
Johnson hall and vowed to remain there until administrators met their four 
demands. Demands were to “remove all Naval recruiters from campus, end ROTC, 
amnesty for individuals arrested as a result of last week’s disturbances, and 
removal of all police from campus”. Eventually President Clark and faculty 
advisors allowed the students to remain in protest as long as they adhered by 
the law. The points of interest in the article are the four demands made by 
the protestors, specifically the amnesty of protestors arrested the day 
before. As hypothesized, students reacted with more forms of protest and 
challenged the administration after protestors were punished, rather than 
having their causes deferred.  
 While tensions continued between the administration and the student 
body, on May 6, 1970 students scheduled a three-day strike. Opposed to 
Nixon’s expansion into Cambodia, students felt desperate to demonstrate their 
hatred for the war and for America’s irresponsibility in acknowledging the 
anti-war movements. The article discussed motivation for the strike, 
protestors involved including ASUO member Ron Eachus, a Vietnam Veteran, 
Black Panther member, and a local Eugene policeman. Members at the strike 
meeting urged protestors to broaden their protest to the greater community. 
As students were protesting on campus, Frank was protesting in Vietnam.  
Frank’s job was to ride in a helicopter scanning the top of the jungle 
looking for signs from wounded soldiers. Once victims were spotted he was 
lowered from the helicopter with nothing more than a medic kit and a few 
other supplies. The helicopter would either leave if there was imminent 
danger, (they were being shot at), or it would circle back around. On the 
ground Frank would assess the amount of casualties, find the victims that 
were still alive, bandage them quickly, and then strap them onto a bed that 
would be lifted into the air by the helicopter. He was then left in the 
jungle until another helicopter could return and find him; sometimes he was 
left there for several days. By the end of the war Frank’s missions into the 
jungle would last between two to six weeks at a time. On occasion Frank’s 
troop would be assigned “hot zone” pursuits. The troop would begin at point A 
and was supposed to travel to point E over a five-day period, stopping each 
day at each intermediate point, B, C, D. At each point they were to create a 
small clearing and set up their tanks in a semi-circle. The objective was 
that when the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese approached these areas the troop 
was to engage in open fire to ward/kill off the enemy. Because Frank knew the 
Viet Cong were not easily defeated, he convinced his troop to avoid the “hot 
zones”. They would travel from point A to point E in a day and each night 
would radio headquarters claiming to be at point B, C, or D. Headquarters 
would believe them because the jungle was so thick that monitoring troop 
location was impossible by helicopters, their word had to be enough. And so 
by defying his order, and honoring his anti-war beliefs, Frank demonstrated 
his own form of protest.  
In a similar situation, Frank continued to defy authority. Soldiers were 
prohibited from wearing white t-shirts at all times, they had to wear colors 
that would blend into the Vietnam jungle. The mere rules of authority enraged 
Frank and so he continued to wear his white t-shirts while in the bases and 
in the medic hospitals. Also, upon returning from a week in the jungle, Frank 
limped onto base with his automatic strung to his back. He walked right past 
an officer of higher authority and did not salute. The officer stopped him 
and yelled at him demanding why a soldier would not respect his superiors. 
With the loaded automatic on his back Frank took it off and held it in his 
hands as he looked up at the officer and said he had just been at war for 
eight days and the last thing he needed to do was to salute an officer. 
Startled at the braveness of the soldier, the officer backed down and 
subordinately walked away. Through both his words and his actions, Frank’s 
own rhetoric had an impact on the soldiers in his troop. He recognizes the 
effect of rhetoric and the importance it had on uniting protestors for their 
cause. 
Within The Emerald articles, the power of rhetoric presented itself once 
again. In an interview with Gratin Kearns, Emerald editor from 1969-1970, he 
discussed his role on the paper and the standards to which he held himself 
and staff accountable. To begin, Kearns explained his motivation for working 
on the Emerald, “I wrote and did deskwork for the Emerald for a year, and ran 
for editor of the paper as a way to keep the editorship from going Republican 
and pro-administration (Nixon administration, that is)”. Kearns saw himself 
as a student leader and used his role with The Emerald  “to put the spotlight 
on the war, racism, and the larger issues of the day, in addition to 
providing the needed coverage of student and campus affairs”. In his own 
words, the paper was a tool for extending his own political beliefs. It is no 
surprise then that the anti-war sentiment of the paper staff and student 
body, would be intertwined with the paper’s publications, and a contributing 
factor to the anti-war sentiment shared on campus.   
In an editorial entitled “Our Side of the Story”, a student activist 
challenged the idea that students are simply anarchists by nature and the 
protests were nothing more than adolescents misbehaving. The paper served as 
an opportunity for students to express their own rhetoric, to redirect 
against the administration, and on a larger scope, the nation’s 
administration. The author stated that “perhaps we should discard the 
insanity and irresponsibility thesis and seek a more penetrating 
explanation…if we wish to merely react out of fear, as we have been, then we 
show the truth has no value to us, and if this is the case then we must admit 
that a university has no place in our society”. The article discussed the 
ROTC building damage and the arrests of student protestors. He argued that 
the arrests were ludicrous, “seven people have been arrested because of the 
radical efforts…all have a 3.0 or higher grade point average and there are 
students in the honors college…they merely put their lives on the line for 
something they care about”. Faculty began to recognize the urgency of 
supporting the students’ efforts with regards to the protests. 
Similar to the administration recognizing the desperation of the student 
protestors, was an unsaid cooperation amongst soldiers in Vietnam. As 
officers were fulfilling their term of duty, or more and more young men were 
being brutally murdered in Vietnam, new officers would be assigned to the 
troops; young officers, just graduating from the army schools, barely out of 
high school. At this time Frank was much older than the officers directing 
him. His maturity and prior experience in Vietnam, combined with his protest 
attitude, united the soldiers once again against the authority. Recalling one 
instance, a nineteen-year old fledgling officer wanted to raid a nearby “hot 
zone”. He encouraged the troop to run in and take over the site, seeing that 
there were Coca-Cola cans and “American” tokens. As the officer approached 
the cans and kicked one over, Frank ordered his troop to remain back and not 
to obey the officer’s orders. Frank’s experience had exposed him to traps by 
the Vietnamese. The Viet Cong would use Coke cans and other American items to 
create bombs and explosives, hoping the American soldiers would approach them 
and be tricked. Fortunately in this case there were no bombs, but after the 
officer realized Frank had more power over his troop than he did, the officer 
surrendered to the alliances already created within the soldiers. Both 
protesters back home as well as the soldiers were realizing in order to be 
successful in their protests, they must be united. 
U of O faculty also acknowledged the necessity in uniting with the students 
on the anti-war issue. On May 3, 1970, an editorial was published stating the 
results of a vote by the faculty regarding the war. “With a strong voice 
vote, the University faculty took a stand against the United States 
involvement in the war in Indo-china”, this vote was conducted outside 
MacArthur Court during a monthly faculty meeting led by President Clark. 
There were two main professors who spoke on behalf of the opposing sides, one 
was Professor Richard Noyes, who believed “students deserve to know what the 
collective faculty opinion is on an issue that has had such a great impact on 
University life.” The only other professor to elaborate on his vote was Frank 
Lowenthal an assistant professor, who said “for the faculty to take a stand 
on the war would be ‘embarking on a road that could lead to the destruction 
of academic freedom at this University’”. By the end of the student protests, 
the faculty agreed with the students and struggled with their own challenges 
in separating their positions as academic leaders and active anti-war 
Americans.  
 By the end of the anti-war protests, the U of O students were able to 
unite the campus and gain the support of the faculty. Soldiers in Vietnam who 
were opposed to the war were also able to form alliances and support one 
another in their efforts to protest the violence. What are overlooked often, 
is the similarities between the two forms of protest. Both the students and 
the soldiers were effected by the power of rhetoric, allowing their anti-war 
sentiment to be shaped, changed, and even determined by the rhetoric 
surrounding them from peers, media, and the administration. The protestors 
and student leaders of 1968-1970, adamantly tried to persuade the faculty, 
administration, and remaining sectors of the student population to join their 
cause. It was a juxtaposed time, violent and anarchic protests received the 
most media coverage and for protestors publicity was an overall goal.  
Thus, the news coverage of violent protests only encouraged a continuance  of 
protests of the same, if not increased magnitude, resulting in a cycle that 
became out of control with regards to the Kent State shootings, a shooting at 
the EMU at U of O, a bombing in PLC, and ROTC vandalism. Likewise, the 
soldiers who were opposed to the war were juxtaposed between the two worlds 
of non-violence protests and a violent world of war. Reexamining this time 
period, history is revealing the similarities between the anti-war protests 
of both the students and the soldiers, both based on the desperation of the 
protesters and the helplessness of the time period. Had student protestors 
known the soldier protests that were occurring in Vietnam, and if the media 
coverage has been more accurate from the beginning, rather than the 
administration manipulating coverage with the power of rhetoric, perhaps the 
protests on campuses would have had a much different pattern. After the war 
Frank received several honorary awards including a Purple Heart. But he 
prefers not to be rewarded or praised for his efforts in the war. Due to the 
way the war has been recorded, and from the generalizations of the brutality 
of the war, many veterans do not feel the same intensity of honor that 
veterans from other wars share. Perhaps for the future, a new approach to 
remembering the Vietnam War is to illuminate the strong anti-war sentiment 
that was shared by the soldiers, connecting them to the nation’s overall 
anti-war protests rather than separating the two. The more research that is 
being conducted, the weaker generalizations of Vietnam become. The most 
important thing is that people continue to share their stories, and that 
students continue to remain interested in the turbulent time period. In the 
end, generalizations should be weighed in a skeptical manner; after all, a 
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